BEFORE MONGOLS I – MOSCOW SERIES 02
MOSCOW 1400–1500: From a Principality of the Golden Horde to an Emerging Eurasian Power
By Altanbagana Baatar
DBA Candidate| Independent Historian
ImperialGG Historical Research Seriers
16 July 2026
The Century in Which Moscow Rose from the Political World of the Golden Horde
The fifteenth century is often presented as the age in which Moscow “freed Russia from Mongol rule.”
From a Mongolian and broader Eurasian perspective, however, the transformation was far more complex.
Moscow did not suddenly emerge outside the political world created by the Mongol Empire. For generations, its rulers had risen within the system of the Jochid Ulus—the Golden Horde. Their political authority had been recognized by the khans, their rivals had competed for the same recognition, and Moscow itself had benefited enormously from its position within the Horde’s administrative and tributary order.
What changed during the fifteenth century was not simply that Moscow defeated the Mongols.
The greater transformation was the fragmentation of the Golden Horde itself.
As competing Chinggisid dynasties and regional centers struggled for control of the Jochid political inheritance, Moscow gradually gained the opportunity to transform itself from a subordinate principality into an increasingly autonomous Eurasian state.
1400–1425: Moscow Still Within the World of the Horde
At the beginning of the fifteenth century, Moscow was growing, but it was not yet an independent great power.
Vasily I, who ruled from 1389 to 1425, inherited a principality whose political position had been strengthened during the previous century.
Yet Moscow remained deeply connected to the politics of the steppe.
The decisive background to this period was the conflict between Tokhtamysh Khan and Timur.
Tokhtamysh had once restored much of the political unity of the Golden Horde, but his wars with Timur devastated important centers of Jochid power during the 1390s. The resulting disruption weakened the ability of any single khan to exercise continuous authority across the entire western steppe.
For Moscow, this created new political space.
But the decline of centralized authority did not mean that Mongol power had disappeared.
The fifteenth century would instead become an age of competing Mongol successor states.
The Fragmentation of the Golden Horde
The political world inherited from Jochi gradually divided into several centers of power.
The Great Horde remained an important successor to the central traditions of the Golden Horde. Elsewhere, the Kazan, Crimean, Astrakhan and Siberian khanates emerged as major political forces.
These were not simply remnants waiting to disappear.
They were active Eurasian states with armies, diplomatic networks, dynastic legitimacy, commercial interests, and their own relationships with Moscow, Lithuania, Poland, the Ottoman world, and Central Asia.
Moscow’s rise therefore took place inside a changing balance of power among the successor states of the former Golden Horde.
This distinction is essential.
Moscow did not confront a single united Mongol empire during the fifteenth century. It increasingly maneuvered among competing heirs of the Jochid political world.
1425–1453: The Muscovite Civil War
After the death of Vasily I in 1425, Moscow entered a prolonged dynastic conflict.
Vasily II struggled against rival members of his own dynasty, particularly Yuri of Zvenigorod and Yuri’s sons.
This civil war reveals an important reality often overlooked in simplified national histories.
The political structure of northeastern Rus’ was still unstable.
The future dominance of Moscow was not inevitable.
Moscow could have lost its leading position.
During these struggles, relations with Mongol rulers remained politically important. Rus’ princes continued to interact with different khans and steppe factions, seeking military and political advantages in their own internal conflicts.
The boundary between “Russian politics” and “steppe politics” was therefore far less absolute than later historical narratives often suggest.
They remained interconnected parts of the same Eurasian political environment.
1445: The Battle of Suzdal — A Forgotten Warning
One of the most revealing events of the century occurred in 1445.
Forces of the Kazan Khanate defeated the army of Vasily II near Suzdal.
Vasily himself was captured.
The event demonstrates clearly that the military power of the Mongol successor states remained formidable even in the middle of the fifteenth century.
This was not yet an age in which Moscow stood unchallenged over the steppe.
Moscow remained one power among several competing states.
Its eventual dominance was still a future development.
1453: Constantinople Falls — Moscow Looks Toward a New Imperial Identity
The Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453 transformed the political and religious imagination of the Orthodox world.
For Moscow, the disappearance of the Byzantine Empire eventually opened the possibility of claiming a larger religious and imperial role.
This process accelerated under Ivan III.
In 1472, Ivan married Sophia Palaiologina, a niece of the last Byzantine emperor.
Later Muscovite ideology increasingly presented Moscow as a major center of Orthodox Christianity and eventually as an heir to the Byzantine imperial tradition.
But Moscow’s emerging political culture cannot be understood through Byzantine influence alone.
Its institutions had also developed during more than two centuries of interaction with the Mongol political world.
Thus the emerging Muscovite state stood at the intersection of several inheritances:
Rus’ dynastic tradition.
Orthodox Christianity and Byzantine political symbolism.
And the political geography and imperial practices of the Eurasian steppe.
1462: Ivan III and the Transformation of Moscow
Ivan III came to power in 1462.
His reign marked one of the decisive periods in the creation of the Muscovite state.
He expanded Moscow’s territory, reduced the independence of rival principalities, strengthened central authority, and increasingly presented himself as a sovereign ruler.
Novgorod was brought under Moscow’s control in 1478.
Tver followed in 1485.
Through warfare, diplomacy, dynastic claims, and political pressure, Moscow gradually absorbed competing Rus’ centers.
Yet Ivan III’s success must also be understood within the larger transformation of the steppe.
The Golden Horde was no longer politically unified.
Different Chinggisid states competed against one another.
Moscow learned to exploit these divisions.
This strategy would become one of the defining characteristics of its later expansion.
Moscow and the Crimean Khanate: The Alliance Often Forgotten
One of the greatest contradictions in the traditional narrative of Moscow’s “liberation from Mongol rule” is Moscow’s relationship with the Crimean Khanate.
Ivan III developed an important political relationship with Crimean Khan Mengli Giray.
Both rulers had a common rival:
The Great Horde.
Thus, while Moscow was resisting the authority of one Mongol successor state, it was simultaneously developing cooperation with another.
This fact fundamentally complicates the idea of a simple war between “Russia” and “the Mongols.”
The political reality was a network of competing states and alliances.
Moscow against the Great Horde.
Crimea against the Great Horde.
Moscow and Crimea cooperating when their strategic interests aligned.
The steppe was not one political bloc.
Neither were the Rus’ lands.
1480: The Great Stand on the Ugra River
The confrontation on the Ugra River in 1480 is traditionally described as the final end of the “Mongol yoke.”
But the event should be understood in its wider geopolitical context.
The forces of Ivan III faced those of Akhmat Khan of the Great Horde.
Yet no decisive great battle destroyed the Mongol army.
The two forces confronted one another across the river before Akhmat eventually withdrew.
More importantly, Akhmat was operating within a much larger strategic crisis.
The Great Horde faced enemies on several fronts, including the Crimean Khanate under Mengli Giray, Moscow’s strategic partner.
The political significance of 1480 was nevertheless enormous.
Moscow would no longer accept the old relationship of political subordination to the Great Horde.
But this was not the moment when Moscow separated itself from the entire Mongol world.
Rather, Moscow had successfully used the fragmentation of that world to establish its own sovereignty.
The distinction is fundamental.
1480 was not simply “Russia defeating the Mongols.”
It represented the emergence of Moscow as an independent actor within a post-Golden Horde Eurasian political order.
1481: Akhmat Khan and the Politics of the Steppe
The events following the Ugra confrontation are equally revealing.
Akhmat Khan was killed in 1481 amid continuing struggles among steppe powers.
The Great Horde’s position continued to deteriorate.
Meanwhile, the Crimean Khanate grew stronger.
Moscow benefited enormously from this changing balance.
The state that had once risen under the protection and political recognition of the Golden Horde was now becoming capable of negotiating with—and manipulating—the rival successor states of that same imperial world.
1485–1500: The Foundations of a New Eurasian State
By the end of the fifteenth century, Moscow had changed fundamentally.
Tver had been annexed.
Novgorod had been incorporated.
The authority of the grand prince had expanded.
A new law code, the Sudebnik of 1497, contributed to the centralization of the state.
The Kremlin was transformed with monumental new construction.
Diplomatic relations expanded.
Imperial symbols became increasingly important.
Yet Moscow was still only beginning its transformation.
The great eastward expansion into the territories of the former Mongol successor states would come later.
Kazan would fall in 1552.
Astrakhan in 1556.
Expansion into Siberia would follow.
Over the following centuries, Moscow would gradually occupy much of the geographical space that had once belonged to the Mongol imperial world.
The Deeper Historical Question
The history of 1400–1500 therefore raises a more important question than the traditional story of the “end of Mongol rule.”
How did a principality that had risen within the political system of the Golden Horde become one of the principal heirs to the Eurasian world that emerged after its fragmentation?
Moscow inherited the political geography created by centuries of Mongol rule.
It interacted continuously with Chinggisid states.
It adopted diplomacy suited to the steppe world.
It formed alliances with Mongol khans against other Mongol khans.
And eventually, it began expanding into the territories of those successor states.
Seen from this perspective, the fifteenth century was not simply the end of one historical era.
It was a transfer of power within Eurasia.
The Golden Horde fragmented.
Its successor states competed.
Moscow survived, centralized, and expanded.
By 1500, the principality that had once sought political recognition from the khans was becoming a state capable of competing for the inheritance of the very Eurasian order in which it had risen.
The story of Moscow was no longer merely the story of Rus’.
It was becoming the story of a new Eurasian empire.
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MOSCOW 1500–1600: The Conquest of the Jochid World and the Birth of a New Eurasian Empire From One
From One State Among Many to an Expanding Imperial Power
At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the political world of northern Eurasia remained deeply shaped by the legacy of the Mongol Empire.
The Golden Horde had fragmented, but the Jochid political world had not disappeared. The Crimean Khanate, Kazan Khanate, Astrakhan Khanate, Siberian Khanate, the Nogai Horde, and other steppe powers continued to control enormous territories, trade routes, cities, and populations across Eurasia. Many of their rulers claimed legitimacy through descent from Chinggis Khan.
Moscow was another rising power within this changing world. Its rulers had spent generations interacting with the khans of the Golden Horde. They had received political recognition from them, competed for their support, collected tribute within the Horde’s political system, and eventually learned to exploit divisions among the successor states.
During the sixteenth century, however, Moscow moved beyond this earlier strategy. It began intervening directly in the internal politics of the Mongol successor states. It supported rival claimants to their thrones. It formed alliances with some khans against others. It attempted to install rulers favorable to Moscow. And when political influence was no longer sufficient, it increasingly turned to permanent territorial conquest.
The story of 1500–1600 is therefore not simply the story of “Russia expanding eastward.” It is the story of a fundamental redistribution of power within the post-Golden Horde world.
1500: The Jochid World Was Still Alive
Around 1500, there was no single political power dominating the former territories of the Golden Horde. Instead, several competing states had emerged.
The Crimean Khanate controlled much of the northern Black Sea steppe. Kazan dominated the Middle Volga. Astrakhan controlled the Lower Volga and access toward the Caspian Sea. The Nogai Horde remained an important steppe confederation between the Volga and the Ural regions. Farther east, the Siberian Khanate participated in the political networks of western Siberia.
These states were not merely dying fragments of a vanished empire. They conducted diplomacy. They fought wars. They controlled trade routes. They formed alliances with Lithuania, Poland, Moscow, the Ottoman Empire, and one another. Most importantly, they competed among themselves over the political inheritance of the Jochid Ulus.
Moscow’s rise occurred within this competition.
1502: The Great Horde Falls — But Not to Moscow Alone
One of the decisive events occurred in 1502. The Great Horde, which had continued to claim the central political inheritance of the Golden Horde, was defeated by Mengli Giray of Crimea.
This event fundamentally altered the balance of power. It is therefore misleading to imagine that Moscow simply destroyed the Golden Horde and inherited its position. The destruction of the Great Horde was itself largely the result of conflict within the Jochid world. Crimea emerged as one of the strongest heirs of the Golden Horde.
Moscow benefited from this transformation because Ivan III and Mengli Giray had developed a strategic alliance against common rivals. Thus, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, Moscow’s independence was closely connected to the success of one Mongol successor state against another.
But alliances do not last forever. As Moscow expanded southward and eastward, yesterday’s ally would gradually become tomorrow’s rival.
Kazan: The Political Battlefield Between Moscow and Crimea
No state better demonstrates the complexity of sixteenth-century Eurasian politics than the Kazan Khanate.
Kazan stood at the center of the Middle Volga world. Its population was diverse. Its commercial connections stretched across the Volga, the steppe, the Urals, and Central Asia. Its ruling elite was divided into competing political factions.
Some favored closer relations with Moscow. Others looked toward Crimea. Still others sought greater political independence from both. The struggle over the Kazan throne therefore became part of a much larger geopolitical contest.
Moscow increasingly attempted to influence who would rule Kazan.
Shah Ali and Moscow’s Strategy of Dynastic Intervention
One of the most important figures in this process was Shah Ali, a Chinggisid prince of the Qasim Khanate. Moscow repeatedly supported Shah Ali as a candidate for the Kazan throne.
This reveals an important feature of Muscovite expansion. Moscow did not initially seek to abolish Chinggisid political legitimacy. Instead, it attempted to use that legitimacy. A Chinggisid ruler favorable to Moscow could provide political influence without direct annexation.
This strategy represented a transition between the older world of steppe diplomacy and the emerging politics of Muscovite imperial expansion. But Kazan’s political elites did not always accept Moscow’s preferred rulers. Shah Ali’s position remained fragile.
The struggle continued.
The Giray Connection: Crimea Enters the Kazan Struggle
Crimea also sought influence in Kazan. The rise of Safa Giray brought the Kazan throne into the wider political orbit of the Giray dynasty. This intensified the rivalry between Moscow and Crimea.
The conflict over Kazan was therefore not simply: Moscow versus Kazan.
It was simultaneously: Moscow versus Crimean influence. Competing factions within Kazan. Different Chinggisid dynastic claims. Nogai political interests. And, increasingly, the wider strategic presence of the Ottoman Empire.
The fate of Kazan was being shaped by an entire Eurasian political system.
The Nogai Horde: The Forgotten Power Between Empires
The Nogai Horde played an especially important role in this changing balance. Located across the steppe between the Volga and the Ural regions, the Nogais were deeply involved in the politics of Kazan, Astrakhan, Crimea, and Moscow.
Nogai elites were themselves divided into competing factions. Some maintained relations with Moscow. Others cooperated with Crimea or other steppe powers. Marriage alliances also connected the Nogai elite to the ruling dynasties of neighboring khanates.
Moscow increasingly learned how to use these internal divisions.
This would become a recurring pattern of Russian imperial expansion: establish relations with one faction, support it against another, intervene in succession disputes, create political dependency, and eventually transform influence into territorial control.
1533–1547: Moscow Faces Its Own Political Crisis
The rise of Moscow was not uninterrupted. After the death of Vasily III in 1533, his son Ivan IV was still a child.
Muscovite elites competed for influence. The state experienced intense internal struggles. Meanwhile, the neighboring khanates remained active and powerful.
This period is important because it demonstrates that Moscow’s later conquest of Kazan was not inevitable. The balance of power could still shift.
The future Eurasian empire had not yet been created.
1547: Ivan IV Becomes Tsar
In 1547, Ivan IV was crowned Tsar. The adoption of this title represented an important transformation in Moscow’s political ideology.
Byzantine traditions certainly contributed to the development of Muscovite imperial thought. But the Eurasian political context must also be remembered. For centuries, Rus’ chronicles had encountered the idea of supreme sovereign authority through both Byzantine emperors and the khans of the Mongol world.
Across the steppe, legitimate supreme rule remained closely associated with Chinggisid descent. Ivan IV could not claim Chinggisid ancestry.
Moscow therefore developed a different ideological foundation for imperial sovereignty—combining Rus’ dynastic tradition, Orthodox Christianity, Byzantine symbolism, and its growing territorial power.
The ruler who had once been one prince among many was now presenting himself as an imperial sovereign.
1540s–1552: The Final Struggle for Kazan
The final years before the conquest of Kazan were characterized by intense political instability. Moscow repeatedly intervened. Different rulers were installed and removed. Pro-Moscow and anti-Moscow factions struggled for control. Crimean influence remained important. Nogai alliances shifted.
The death of Safa Giray in 1549 further destabilized the political situation. Eventually, Moscow attempted once again to establish Shah Ali. But the political arrangement collapsed.
By this stage, Ivan IV’s government moved away from indirect control. The strategy changed from influencing Kazan to conquering it.
1552: The Conquest of Kazan
In 1552, Moscow launched its decisive campaign. Kazan fell after a major siege.
The event marked a fundamental break with the previous political order. Moscow had intervened in Kazan’s politics for decades. It had supported Chinggisid rulers. It had attempted to create dependent governments.
Now it abolished the khanate as an independent state.
This was not merely another frontier war. For the first time, Moscow permanently incorporated the territory of one of the principal successor states of the Golden Horde.
The consequences extended far beyond Kazan. The conquest changed the balance of power throughout the Volga region. It placed new pressure on Astrakhan. It altered relations with the Nogais. It threatened Crimean strategic interests. And it opened Moscow’s path farther east.
1552 marks the moment when Moscow’s policy toward the Jochid successor states shifted decisively from political participation to imperial incorporation.
Astrakhan: Control of the Lower Volga
After Kazan, the struggle moved south.
Astrakhan occupied an extraordinarily important strategic position. It controlled the Lower Volga near the Caspian Sea and stood at the intersection of trade routes connecting northern Eurasia, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Caspian world.
Like Kazan, Astrakhan experienced internal political struggles. Moscow intervened in these disputes. It supported rulers favorable to its interests. But once again, political influence gradually gave way to direct control. In 1556, Moscow annexed Astrakhan. With Kazan and Astrakhan under its authority, Moscow now controlled most of the Volga corridor.
This was one of the greatest geopolitical transformations of the sixteenth century. The Volga had been a central artery of the Golden Horde.
Now Moscow was taking possession of that imperial geography.
Crimea and the Ottoman Empire Respond
The conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan fundamentally changed Moscow’s relationship with the Crimean Khanate.
Crimea was not an isolated steppe state. It belonged to a larger Black Sea political system and maintained a close relationship with the Ottoman Empire.
From the Crimean and Ottoman perspective, Moscow’s advance toward the Lower Volga represented a major strategic threat. Control of Astrakhan affected communications and political connections between the Black Sea, the Caspian region, and Central Asia.
In 1569, an Ottoman-Crimean campaign attempted to challenge Moscow’s position around Astrakhan. The expedition failed.
But the campaign demonstrates that the struggle for the Volga was no longer merely a local conflict. It had become an international Eurasian confrontation.
1571: Devlet Giray Burns Moscow
The greatest demonstration of Crimean power came in 1571.
Khan Devlet I Giray led his forces northward. Moscow was reached and burned. The destruction was enormous.
This event must be included in any serious account of sixteenth-century Russian expansion. Only nineteen years after the conquest of Kazan, the capital of the emerging Muscovite empire was devastated by a Chinggisid khan.
The balance of power remained uncertain. Moscow had conquered major territories. But the steppe remained militarily powerful.
The following year, another Crimean campaign was stopped at the Battle of Molodi. The struggle between Moscow and Crimea would continue for generations.
The Siberian Khanate and the Rise of Küchüm
While Moscow expanded along the Volga, another political transformation was occurring farther east. The Siberian Khanate was itself experiencing dynastic struggles. In the 1560s, Küchüm Khan, a Chinggisid ruler, seized power.
Under Küchüm, the khanate attempted to strengthen its authority across western Siberia. Relations with Moscow became increasingly hostile.
But Moscow’s advance into Siberia initially did not begin as a massive centralized state invasion. Commercial interests, frontier expansion, the Stroganov family, Cossack forces, and state interests gradually converged. This complexity is important.The conquest of Siberia was a process. Not a single campaign.
1580s: Yermak Enters the Siberian Political World
Yermak’s campaign in the early 1580s marked the beginning of a new stage. His forces defeated Küchüm’s troops in several engagements and captured Qashliq, one of the principal centers of the Siberian Khanate.
But Küchüm was not immediately defeated. He continued resistance. In 1585, Yermak himself was killed. The Siberian Khanate continued to fight. Only through continued military expansion and the construction of Russian forts did Moscow gradually establish permanent control. The process would continue beyond 1600.
Once again, the pattern was similar. Moscow entered an existing political conflict. It established military positions. It exploited internal divisions. And eventually, it transformed temporary intervention into permanent territorial expansion.
Chinggisid Princes Inside the Muscovite State
Yet the relationship between Moscow and the Mongol political world was not simply one of conquest. Chinggisid princes increasingly entered Muscovite service. They received estates. They commanded armies. They occupied positions of extraordinary prestige.
The clearest example of the continuing power of Chinggisid legitimacy came in 1575, when Ivan IV temporarily elevated Simeon Bekbulatovich, a Chinggisid prince, as “Grand Prince of All Rus’.” Whatever Ivan’s political motives, the episode reveals something remarkable.
More than three centuries after the first Mongol conquest of the Rus’ principalities, Chinggisid descent still carried exceptional political prestige inside Moscow itself.
The Mongol political world had not simply disappeared. Elements of it were being absorbed into the emerging Muscovite Empire.
A Century of Reversed Power
The transformation becomes clear when we compare three centuries. Around 1300, Moscow was a small principality whose rulers operated under the political supremacy of the Golden Horde.
Around 1400, it was becoming a major regional power while the Horde entered periods of fragmentation.
Around 1500, Moscow was an independent state maneuvering among competing Mongol successor states.
By 1600, Moscow had destroyed the independence of Kazan and Astrakhan, controlled much of the Volga, and begun expanding into Siberia.
But this transformation was not simply the result of Moscow becoming stronger while its neighbors became weaker. It was achieved through participation in the politics of the post-Golden Horde world.
Moscow formed alliances with Mongol rulers. It employed Chinggisid princes. It supported rival candidates for khanates. It exploited factional struggles. It intervened in succession disputes. And finally, it replaced political influence with territorial annexation.
The Greater Eurasian Transformation
By 1600, the map of northern Eurasia had fundamentally changed. The Golden Horde had disappeared as a unified state. But its political geography remained.
The Volga remained a strategic artery. The steppe remained a geopolitical corridor. The former Jochid territories remained home to diverse peoples and political traditions. What changed was the center of expanding power. Moscow was increasingly occupying this space.
Yet one major Mongol successor state remained unconquered: the Crimean Khanate. And beyond Moscow’s expanding frontier lay the enormous territories of Siberia and, farther south and east, powerful Central Asian states. The struggle for the political inheritance of Eurasia was far from over.
1500–1600: The Century in One View
1502 — Mengli Giray destroys the Great Horde.
Early 1500s — Moscow and Crimea shift from strategic partners toward rivalry.
1510–1521 — Moscow absorbs Pskov and Ryazan while consolidating the Rus’ lands.
1520s–1540s — Moscow and Crimea compete for influence over Kazan.
1547 — Ivan IV adopts the title of Tsar.
1552 — Moscow conquers the Kazan Khanate.
1556 — Moscow annexes the Astrakhan Khanate.
1569 — Ottoman-Crimean forces challenge Moscow’s control of Astrakhan.
1571 — Devlet Giray reaches and burns Moscow.
1572 — Crimean forces are stopped at Molodi.
1575 — Chinggisid prince Simeon Bekbulatovich is elevated by Ivan IV.
1580s — Yermak’s campaign begins Moscow’s deeper advance into the Siberian Khanate.
1585 — Yermak is killed; Küchüm’s resistance continues.
By the end of the century, Moscow had not simply “expanded eastward.” It had entered, manipulated, conquered, and begun absorbing large parts of the political world that had emerged from the fragmentation of the Jochid Ulus.
The transformation was not the simple disappearance of one empire and the spontaneous rise of another. It was a long transfer of power within the same interconnected Eurasian world. And by 1600, that transfer was still incomplete.
MYTH & REALITY — History Beyond Legend
From Moscow to the Soviet Union: A Century-by-Century Historical Series
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